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1996	 				329	 1370	 166,400	 35,492	 	
1997	 			341	 1566	 176,200	 37,005	 173,494	
1998	 			437	 1792	 181,900	 38,885	 182,308	
1999	 				524	 1708	 195,600	 40,696	 190,798	
2000	 			544	 1532	 207,000	 41,990	 196,864	
2001	 			685	 1568	 213,200	 42,228	 197,980	
2002	 			907	 1788	 228,700	 42,409	 198,828	
2003	 	1112	 2057	 246,300	 43,318	 203,089	
2004	 	1211	 2042	 274,500	 44,334	 207,852	
2005	 	1351	 1994	 297,000	 46,326	 217,233	
2006	 	1327	 1649	 305,900	 48,201	 226,025	
2007	 	1057	 1037	 313,600	 50,233	 235,553	
2008	 			319	 		560	 292,600	 50,303	 235,881	
2009	 			186	 		581	 270,900	 49,777	 233,414	
2010	 	-167	 		539	 272,900	 49,276	 231,065	
2011	 			104	 		694	 263,400	 50,054	 234,713	
2012	 			105	 		976	 285,400	 51,017	 239,229	
2013	 				223	 1010	 319,300	 53,585	 251,271	
2014	 				312	 1081	 312,500	 53,657	 251,609	
2015	 				407	 1160	 352,500	 56,516	 265,015	
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		The	choice	between	an	income	or	asset	based	mortgage	lending	system	is	made	by	the	suppliers	of	funds:	the	lenders.	Their	collective	action	of	mortgage	lending	can	have	 two	 totally	 different	 effects.	 If,	 for	 2003,	 the	 volume	 of	 lending	was	 solely	restricted	 to	 follow	 the	 income	 earning	 capacity	 of	 the	 borrowers,	 then	 -as	 the	calculations	in	above	statistics	showed-	the	mortgage	volume	needed	to	built	about	1.6	 million	 homes	 would	 have	 been	 $325	 billion.	 Instead	 $1.112	 trillion	 was	provided	 as	 new	 mortgages.	 The	 extra	 $787	 billion	 was	 used	 to	 drive	 up	 the	average	house	price	to	$246,300	rather	than	the	$203,089	one;	the	latter	figure	is	based	 on	 the	 income	 earning	 capacity.	 In	 2003,	 lenders	 funded	 the	 U.S.	 housing	market	 predominantly	 based	 on	 asset	 prices	 rather	 than	 on	 an	 income	 earning	capacity.		The	 differences	 between	 these	 two	 methods	 of	 funding	 are	 key	 to	 the	understanding	of	the	financial	crisis.	Households	took	up	the	full	$1.112	trillion	in	new	mortgages	in	2003.	Their	income	growth	could	only	support	 	$325	billion	in	new	mortgage	 debt.	 Their	 future	 “negative”	 income	 impact	 was	 $787	 billion,	 or	$43,211	 per	 each	 new	 home	 built	 in	 2003.	 It	 also	 happens	 to	 be	 equal	 to	 a	 full	year’s	 income	 based	 of	 the	 median	 nominal	 income	 for	 2003.	 Furthermore	 this	phenomenon	 of	 supplying	 the	 housing	market	with	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 funds	 than	income	growth	could	absorb,	started	already	in	1999.	In	1999	$219	billion	was	the	overfunded	amount,	 in	2000	$229	billion,	 in	2001	$369	billion	and	in	2002	$589	billion.	 The	 total	 negative	 income	 impact	 for	 the	 years	 1999-2003	 was	 $2.19	trillion.	 On	 a	 nominal	 median	 income	 of	 $43,318	 in	 2003,	 every	 mortgage	borrower	had	a	negative	future	income	impact	$253,091,	which	nearly	represents	6	years	of	average	earnings.	The	$2.19	trillion	represented	31.7%	of	all	mortgage	debt	 outstanding	 per	 end	 of	 2003.	 To	 express	 this	 in	 other	 terms,	 if	mortgagors	would	have	been	kept	on	 the	mortgage	payments	according	 to	 the	 income	based	funding	method,	their	maturity	of	their	mortgage	would	have	to	be	extended	by	9.5	years	to	39.5	years,	due	to	this	asset	based	mortgage	funding	system.	These	facts	are	based	on	data	from	1999	to	2003.	The	asset	based	funding	cycle	did	not	stop	in	2003	and	went	on	well	into	2007.		A	mortgage	extension	of	nearly	 ten	years	on	average	 indicated	 that	 the	 financial	crisis	 for	 individual	 households	 occurred	 in	 2003.	 This	 was	 well	 before	 the	accelerated	sales	drive	of	subprime	mortgages,	which	started	from	2004,	and	the	extensive	 use	 of	mortgage	 securitization,	which	 also	 started	more	 or	 less	 at	 the	same	time.	An	IMF	Working	paper	of	20131	:	“Securitization:	Lessons	learned	and	the	 road	 ahead”,	 deals	 extensively	 with	 the	 subject	 of	 subprime	 mortgages	 and	their	securitization.																																																									1	https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13255.pdf	
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2.2	The	speed	of	mortgage	lending		One	can	distinguish	two	different	speeds	in	mortgage	lending;	the	first	one	is	the	speed	for	an	individual	household	to	get	a	mortgage	approved.	For	each	individual	this	is	the	most	important	speed.	However	there	is	also	a	macro-economic	speed	in	mortgage	 lending,	 being	 the	 volume	 of	 all	 new	 home	 mortgages	 disbursed	 in	 a	single	year.		In	the	U.S.	in	1997,	the	total	home	mortgage	lending	volume	was	$	341	billion.	By	2003	this	volume	had	increased	to	$1.112	trillion.	The	speed	of	lending	had	more	than	tripled,	to	be	exact	by	326%.		Why	is	such	macro-economic	speed	important?			This	speed	should	be	 linked	to	 income	growth	 levels	of	 individual	households,	 to	population	growth	and	to	changes	in	the	quality	of	desirable	homes.		The	 nominal	 median	 income	 levels	 of	 households	 in	 the	 U.S.	 increased	 from	$37,005	in	1997	to	$43,318	in	2003,	an	increase	in	income	levels	of	17.06%.	The	median	 income	 levels	 are	 calculated	 on	 basis	 that	 half	 of	 the	 numbers	 of	households	earn	less	than	the	median	level	and	the	other	half	earn	more.			The	 second	 element	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 is	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 of	households	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2003.	 In	 1997,	 there	 were	 102.5	 million	households	 in	 the	 U.S	 and	 by	 2003	 the	 number	 had	 grown	 to	 112	 million;	 a	household	 numbers	 growth	 of	 9.27%	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2003	 or	 nearly	 1.6	million	new	households	each	year.		In	1997,	 the	percentage	of	homes	owned	was	65.7%	of	all	homes	or	67.3	million	homes.	By	2003,	the	ownership	rate	had	gone	up	to	68.6%	of	all	homes	or	76.83	million	homes.	Between	1997	and	2003	11.2	million	new	homes	were	built,	more	than	covering	the	increase	in	home	ownership	rates.		On	nearly	all	accounts,	such	as	the	growing	number	of	new	housing	starts	over	the	period	1997-2003,	the	increase	in	the	percentage	of	households	owning	their	own	home,	the	fact	that	new	housing	starts	outstripped	the	level	of	home	building	for	owner-occupier	transactions,	all	justified	the	belief	that	these	developments	were	signs	of	a	healthy	economic	development.		What	 was	 clearly	 overlooked	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 nearly	 all	 these	 positive	developments	were	only	made	possible,	not	by	households	using	their	own	income	and	 savings	 to	 reach	 these	 goals,	 but	 by	 massively	 extending	 their	 borrowed	money	(mortgage)	obligations.	With	a	nominal	median	income	growth	of	17.06%	over	 the	 period	 1997-2003,	 individual	 households	 increased	 their	 mortgage	borrowing	levels	by	326%	over	the	same	period.		
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																																																																																		How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		In	 the	U.S.	 over	 the	period	1997-2003,	 the	 household	mortgage	debts	 to	 income	levels	were	totally	ignored.	It	should	have	come	as	no	surprise	that	when	massive	amounts	 of	 borrowed	 funds	were	pumped	 into	 the	property	markets	 that	 house	prices	 accelerated	 faster	 than	 in	 previous	 years.	 This	 fact	 provided	 lenders	 and	borrowers	with	 the	 impression	 that	 loans	 to	 values	were	 improving	 rather	 than	declining.	 Such	a	 fata	morgana	misled	most	bankers	and	equally	 the	 supervisory	authorities.		
	
2.3	The	short	term	over	the	long	term		Most	 economists	 focus	 on	 short-term	developments,	 like	 the	next	 quarterly	GDP	growth	figure,	the	monthly	inflation	level,	the	level	of	new	housing	starts,	the	level	of	unemployment	and	the	quarterly	income	growth	data.		In	2003,	U.S	GDP	growth	level	ran	at	2.8%	on	an	annual	basis;	the	unemployment	level	fluctuated	from	5.8%	in	January	to	6.3%	in	June	to	5.7%	by	December	and	the	CPI-U	inflation	levels	started	the	year	at	2.60%	in	January	and	finished	the	year	at	2.27%	in	December.		By	 December	 2003,	 there	 were	 2,057,000	 new	 housing	 starts	 made	 on	 an	annualized	basis	in	the	U.S.		U.S.	 wide	 nominal	 median	 family	 income	 was	 $43,318	 over	 fiscal	 year	 2003	compared	to	$40,696	over	1999.		All	these	short-term	economic	indicators	showed	a	very	respectable	performance.		There	 is	nothing	wrong	with	such	obsession	with	short-term	data	 interpretation.	Economic	models	 are	 built	 around	 such	 short-term	movements.	 However,	 there	are	elements	in	economic	developments,	which	cannot	be	captured	by	short-term	data,	but	have	to	be	studied	with	an	eye	to	the	longer	term.		In	 previous	 papers,	 the	 writer	 has	 drawn	 attention	 to	 the	 long-term	 risks	 that	home	mortgage	borrowings	levels	can	represent	to	the	disposable	income	levels	of	individual	households.	It	was	demonstrated	that	the	cycle	that	started	in	1997	did	last	to	2017.	Preventive	measures	were	not	taken	in	2003	and	curative	measures	after	2007-2008	did	not	prioritize	saving	households	from	the	damaging	effects	of	a	 fall	 in	 house	 prices	 and	 a	 drop	 in	 incomes.	 Nearly	 all	 banks	 were	 saved,	 but	households	 had	 to	 fence	 for	 themselves,	with	 the	 disastrous	 economic	 results	 of	slow	or	no	growth,	a	complete	breakdown	in	new	housing	starts,	a	doubling	of	the	unemployment	rate	from	some	5%	to	10%	in	18	months	and	a	reduction	back	to	5%,	which	took	some	6	years.	U.S	federal	government	debt	doubled	between	2008	and	2017	from	some	$10	trillion	to	just	over	$20	trillion.		The	 statistics	 in	 section	 1.2	 clearly	 show	 the	 longer-term	 picture,	 which	 is	 that	initially	from	1997	to	2003	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	stimulated	the	U.S.		
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	Just	 like	households,	banks	have	to	make	a	 judgment	about	the	borrowers	future	abilities	 to	 repay	a	mortgage	 loan.	As	most	U.S.	mortgages	are	entered	 into	 for	a	period	of	30	years,	such	judgment	requires	a	forecasting	skill	that	relies	more	on		
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	The	interest	rate	instrument	was	used	as	from	January	2005	to	August	2006,	when	the	effective	Fed	Funds	rate	was	increased	from	2.28%	in	January	2005	to	5.24%	by	August	2006.		Was	this	the	right	decision	for	the	market	circumstances	of	the	mortgage	market?		An	interest	rate	increase	does	two	things	with	regard	to	mortgagors	and	individual	households:	 The	 Fed	 by	 raising	 the	 price	 of	 money	 hoped	 that	 the	 volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	would	 slow	down.	The	data	 in	 table	1	 show	 that	 there	was	no	significant	slow	down	in	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	in	2005	and	2006.	In	a		
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																																																																																	How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			way,	 banks	 devised	 products	 that	 slowed	 down	 the	 immediate	 effects	 of	 such	interest	rate	 increase,	by	offering	100%	and	low	interest	rate	start-up	mortgages	for	 a	 few	 years	 after	 which	 the	 full	 effect	 of	 the	 interest	 rate	 increase	 would	become	felt.		The	second	effect	was	supposed	to	be	on	the	average	house	prices.	The	asset-based	method	of	mortgage	funding	had	gone	on	ever	since	1999.	By	2005,	average	house	prices	far	exceeded	the	income-based	house	ones.		A	short-term	instrument,	like	a	movement	of	the	interest	rate,	cannot	correct	a	long-term	imbalance.	House	prices		did	continue	to	rise	in	2005,	2006	and	2007,	perhaps	at	a	slightly	slower	speed,	but	rate	rise	did	little,	if	anything,	to	close	the	gap	between	the	income	based	and	asset	based	 method	 of	 mortgage	 lending.	 The	 interest	 instrument	 proved	 to	 be	unsuitable	 for	 managing	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 assets	 based	 mortgage	 lending	system	and	the	income	based	one.		
Quantitative	Easing	




	The	main	aim	of	managing	systemic	risks	for	individual	households	is	to	ensure	that	a	mortgage-lending	ceiling	 is	assessed	and	subsequently	adhered	to.	 	Such	ceiling	should	be	kept	in	line	with	the	income-based	mortgage	lending	system.			The	second	aim	 is	 to	 take	countervailing	actions	 in	case	 the	ceiling	 levels	have	been	broken.		It	 is	no	solution	just	to	force	banks	to	improve	their	loan	loss	shock	absorption	capacity	 if	 simultaneously	 no	 steps	 are	 taken	 to	 manage	 a	 mortgage-lending	ceiling.	Systemic	risks	on	households	can	be	avoided	and	in	doing	so,	it	will		
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• The	 excessive	 level	 of	 mortgage	 funding	 provided	 by	 the	 collective	 U.S.	financial	sector	over	the	period	1997-2003	created	a	large	gap	between	the	assets	based	method	of	mortgage	funding	and	the	income	based	one.		
• The	gap	can	best	be	illustrated	in	that	the	nominal	income	growth	over	the	period	1997-2003	could,	by	2003,	afford	a	mortgage	level	of	$203,089	per	new	home,	while	the	average	house	price	had	gone	up	to	$246,300.		
• The	gap	can	also	be	illustrated	in	that	in	2003	the	new	mortgage	lending	of	$1.112	 trillion	 would	 have	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 build	 5.475	 million	 new	homes	 on	 a	 100%	mortgage	 basis,	 if	 the	 $203,089	mortgage	 level	 would	have	been	followed.	The	5.475	million	new	homes	were	3.4	times	the	level	of	 demand,	 which	 can	 be	 assessed	 at	 1.6	 million	 new	 homes	 based	 on	population	growth	and	other	factors.		
• The	economic	history	of	the	U.S.	and	other	countries	has	shown	that	in	case	of	excessive	mortgage	lending,	which	causes	house	prices	to	rise	faster	than	income	growth	can	follow,	the	only	real	fall	back	situation	is	on	household’s	incomes.	If	the	fall	back	has	to	depend	on	the	value	of	housing	assets	then	the	drop	in	house	prices	deepen	the	recessionary	trends.		
• In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 U.S.	 this	 fall	 back	 on	 incomes	 involved	 24.475	 million	households	 who	 were	 confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 started	against	 them	 over	 the	 period	 2005-2015;	 this	 represented	 33.3%	 of	 all	73.58	million	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	the	spring	of	2008.	By	all	accounts	 a	 shocking	 verdict	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 banks	 to	 predict	 income	growth	of	individual	households.		
• In	 2003	 or	 in	 later	 years	 the	 authorities	 –Fed	 and	 other	 regulatory	authorities-	did	not	 act	upon	 the	growing	gap	between	asset	based	house	funding	and	the	income	based	one.	Neither	an	interest	rate	adjustment	nor	the	Quantitative	Easing	program	was	directed	to	close	the	gap	between	the	effects	of	 an	 asset	based	mortgage-lending	program	and	an	 income	based	one.		
• In	 2003,	 the	 obvious	 solution	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 ceiling	 was	 not	considered	 necessary,	 as	 the	 prevailing	 philosophy	 was	 that	 markets	 do	sort	themselves	out.	The	cause	of	the	crisis:	the	growing	gap	between	asset	prices	and	income	levels	was	not	seen	as	a	danger	as	the	philosophy	did	not	take	into	account	the	annual	volumes	of	borrowed	funds	allocated	and	to	be	repaid	out	of	future	incomes.		
• By	 2007-2008	 the	 support	 devised	 to	 help	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 grow	 again,	was	based	on	providing	liquidity	to	the	financial	markets,	initially	to	the		
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																																																																																				How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			 ailing	 banks	 and	 subsequently	 to	 the	 government	 and	 mortgage-backed	bond	 markets.	 No	 liquidity	 support	 scheme	 was	 developed	 that	 was	directed	to	individual	households	with	a	mortgage.		
• In	 conclusion,	 the	 U.S.	 household	 mortgage	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	prevented	by	2003,	or	avoided	 to	a	 large	degree	by	2007-2008.	The	2016	indications	are	that	with	an	average	house	price	in	December	of	$384,000	,		the	 gap	 between	 the	 asset	 based	 and	 income	 based	 mortgage	 lending	system	is	growing	again.	Actions	may	need	to	be	taken.		
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